Abstract-Several proposals on P2P-ISP cooperation have recently been developed using information sharing for localitybased peering. Their benefits in terms of P2P efficiency, ISP cost, and traffic localization have been demonstrated in the single ISP case. However, potential risks associated with such cooperation have not been well examined. This paper develops a taxonomy and a mathematical model to explore the unintended and counter-intuitive behaviors emerging out of these cooperations in the multiple ISP case. Through both numerical examples and analytical results, we illustrate how such behaviors may become damaging to both P2P providers and ISPs, and how they might be mitigated so that the full benefit of cooperation can be maintained.
I. INTRODUCTION
Currently, Internet traffic management is carried out by ISPs whereas CDN and P2P determine the source-destination pairs. P2P providers have limited capability to infer network topology; therefore their peering decisions conflict with the interests of the underlying network. If ISPs disclose the topology to the P2P providers and the P2P providers disclose peer locations to the ISPs, the P2P traffic can be distributed more efficiently.
Recently, new cooperation approaches were proposed to enable such information sharing between ISPs and P2P providers [1] , [2] , [3] . They are based on providing the P2P providers with partial information on topology, to enable more preferable peering decisions. In Aggarwal et al. [1] , the authors propose an oracle supported by the ISP that ranks the peers according to the ISP's preferences. In Choffnes et al. [2] , the peers close to the same content distribution network (CDN) server are assigned to each other. In Xie et al. [3] , a trusted party offers peering suggestions to P2P after collecting information from both P2P and ISPs.
It is intuitive that such cooperation improves performance for both ISPs and P2P providers, by assigning peers in close proximity to each other, avoiding network bottlenecks, and preventing downloads from distant locations thus decreasing the backbone traffic. However, through information exchange both P2P providers and ISPs get additional freedom to further manipulate the destination and routing of the traffic, which can lead to unintended or even counter-intuitive outcomes of cooperation. This risk factor is particularly prominent in the Internet reality of multiple ISPs coexisting with their own peering relationships.
Take a brief illustrative example: An ISP can offer to another ISP connection to the rest of the Internet. In a such relationship the ISP who accepts this service gets charged by the provider ISP both for incoming and outgoing traffic. In a peering relationship they exchange traffic without charging each other. Therefore, ISPs are more willing to use the links to their customers or peers than the links to their providers. BGP allows ISPs to show preferences by the path selection. However, ISPs are not always able to avoid certain paths just by tweaking BGP parameters. At this point, P2P providers can further help the ISP by avoiding peering decisions over those paths. Through P2P-ISP cooperation, an ISP might get the advantage to reroute its P2P traffic over the customer links instead of the provider links. This may increase costs for the customer ISPs since they have to send extra content to the provider ISPs.
The above case is one of the several unintended and counterintuitive behaviors in P2P-ISP collaborations. This paper develops a taxonomy and formal framework to quantify and mitigate these risks. Consequent results can be used to help ISP answer the question: Should I participate in these P2P-ISP cooperations given a particular set of peering relationships with other ISPs? We will illustrate through both numerical examples and analytical results the potential issues when P2P providers and ISPs collaborate through partial information sharing. However, we do not intend to discourage such collaborations. They are generally helpful to all parties involved, and can have significantly positive impact after their risks are discovered and bounded.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we point to the main properties and risks of the recent cooperation proposals. Section III generalizes possible outcomes of the P2P-ISP cooperation. Section IV formulates an analytical framework that models the interaction between the ISPs and P2Ps. Section V and VI summarize the numerical and analytical results. Section VII attempts to prevent the undesired results of cooperation by enforcing fairness. Section VIII gives guidelines to prevent risks in P2P-ISP cooperation.
II. CURRENT P2P-ISP COOPERATION APPROACHES AND
THEIR RISKS We start with a brief and qualitative discussion on some of the risks of the ISP-P2P cooperation approaches in [1] , [2] , [3] . [1] end users as shown in Fig. 1 . The oracle ranks these peers for the end user. The end user chooses the peers accordingly.
A risk here is that P2P providers may infer the customerprovider and undisclosed peering relationships by querying the oracles of each ISP. ISP oracles can be unintentionally used as traffic monitors and P2P providers can promote their interests. Consequently, the P2P providers can offer additional benefits to favored ISPs by promoting or hiding their peers, leading to preferential treatments to some ISPs .
Alternatively, an ISP oracle has the freedom to rank the peers according to its preferences, which might not always be in the interest of the peers. Assume the ISP prefers a lowcost congested link to a peer-ISP to a costly but uncongested, high capacity link to the provider-ISP. Therefore, it ranks the peers in the peer-ISP higher than the peers in the provider-ISP. Although they are ranked lower the peers in the provider ISP would improve the download experience of the end-users much more since they are reachable through better links. Also, the ISP oracle may provide different information to each P2P provider. This will cause performance gaps between various P2P providers. Fig. 2 CDNs collect location information to redirect users to their low latency servers, which are located in every ISP. Choffnes et al. [2] propose a CDN based oracle called Ono to reduce costly cross-ISP traffic. Here each peer performs periodic DNS look-ups for popular CDN names as shown in Fig. 2 . If two peers are redirected to the same servers most of the time, they are assumed to be close to each other. The P2P providers assign these peers to each other. This approach localizes traffic using the hints from CDNs. P2P providers make peering decisions without any direct information from ISPs. Further, this approach enables P2P providers to offer preferential treatments to ISPs. CDN server names can be used as an unique identifier of an ISP, and an ISP can reveal its local CDN server names and ask for preferential treatments. Fig. 3 In the P4P approach proposed by Xie et al. [3] , ISPs reveal the network topology to an oracle called iTracker, which lets the P2P providers choose the appropriate peers. iTracker is run by each ISP or by a trusted third party. It assigns each peer to a cluster with an identifier called PID, and computes a distance metric called p4p distance between these PID locations, based on the hints from ISPs. Another entity called appTracker, owned by the P2P provider, assigns peers close in terms of p4p distance to each other. Without revealing the network topology to the P2P providers, this strategy helps to localize the traffic, promising higher rates to the customers while avoiding transit fees and congestion for the ISPs.
B. Approach B: CDN supported Oracle in

C. Approach C: P4P in
Assigning multiple PIDs within the same ISP's network, the iTracker scrambles the revealed information such that P2P providers cannot directly observe the exact network topology. However, it is still possible for the appTracker to reverse engineer the network topology to a certain accuracy and granularity, e.g., by clustering PID's with similar preferences. Some ISPs also might purposefully reveal their PID's to the appTracker hoping for preferential treatment by the peer assignment. ISPs may hide the true topology from iTrackers and trick the appTracker by peering decisions. Therefore, similar risks as in Approach A remains. Table I summarizes the main risks as discussed in the last section. Table II further classifies the risks into (more obvious) "drawbacks" and (less obvious) "counter-intuitive" behaviors, and put them right next to the obvious benefits of ISP-P2P collaborations. 
III. CONSEQUENCES OF P2P-ISP COOPERATION
A. Benefits of Cooperation
Having extra information on network topology or peer locations, ISPs and P2P get additional freedom to manipulate the traffic. Efficiently used, this leads to (1) Localization of traffic and reduction of inter-ISP traffic, (2) Reduction of backbone bandwidth usage, (3) Improved rates for the users.
B. Drawbacks of Cooperation
• No valley peer assignment. 'No valley and prefer customer policy' is a common practice in today's Internet [4] for choosing a route to a destination: A peer route is preferred over a provider route and customer routes are most preferred. The P2P-ISP cooperation enables the ISPs to use the same policy to show the preference for the destination. Consider an ISP that reveals its customerprovider links to the P2P provider and wants the P2P provider to avoid those links when doing peering assignments. If the P2P provider observes the preference of the ISP, the traffic is only allocated using the in-network links and the links to the customer ISPs. Customer ISPs will face higher costs and congestion since they have to send more content to the provider ISPs.
• Preferential Treatment. Consider a P2P provider that observes the preferences of some ISPs more than the others. The favored ISPs and their end users will get more benefits than others. Similarly, an ISP could selectively release information in a way to favor some P2P providers over others.
• Exchanging Misleading Information. An ISP may represent its network topology inaccurately to the P2P provider by hiding inter-ISP links or falsely reporting congestion to force the P2P provider to do peering assignments within the network. It may manipulate the peering decisions of the P2P provider. In order to reduce the inter-ISP traffic for an ISP, the P2P provider might not reveal all of the peers in that ISP. This induces the peers in a neighboring ISP to download from a distant location.
C. Counter-intuitive Outcomes of Cooperation
Cooperation may lead to unfair scenarios where noncooperating ISPs (or cooperating but "less preferred ISPs") get more benefits than cooperating and "preferred ISPs". They might benefit by not cooperating. Selfish behavior by either the P2P providers or the ISPs may lead to degradation in the benefits of cooperation.
Benefits for non-cooperating ISPs:
The cooperating ISPs may not be willing to send content to the peers in noncooperating ISPs, since the location of peers in those cannot be inferred and might require costly paths to reach. If no other ISP is willing to provide content, the non-cooperating ISPs will be forced to supply their traffic demand within the network. Usually the average rate to download a content within the network is much higher than to download it through an inter-ISP link. If the non-cooperating ISP has enough peers to support its demand, it will achieve higher rates than the cooperating ISP, whose users downloads also from the peers in other ISPs. Knowing that the neighboring ISP is cooperating would be a valuable information to decide on joining cooperation.
As an illustrative example, consider the network in Fig. 4 . Each ISP requests a traffic volume V . If an ISP cooperates with the P2P provider, it gets the file within the network with probability 1/2 or from any of the other two ISPs with probability 1/4. If it does not collaborate, it will get the file with probability 1/3 from any ISP including itself. Let the rate for downloading a file from the peers within the network be R and the average rate to download from a peer from another ISP R/2. If none of the ISPs cooperates with the P2P provider, the average download rate for the end users is 0.6R. If all cooperate, the rate is 0.75R. If ISP C is not cooperating, ISP A and ISP B are reluctant to send content to the ISP C. Observing their preference, the P2P provider induces ISP C to download the whole content within the network. Assuming that ISP C has enough peers, the average download rate for
This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the IEEE "GLOBECOM" 2009 proceedings. ISP C users will be R, which is higher than the average rate for the cooperating ISPs. In this case, ISP C is better off by not cooperating. If ISP A and ISP B are providers to most other ISPs, they are eager to send content even to non-cooperating ISPs. So, the P2P provider induces the non-cooperating ISP C to download all traffic content from ISP A and ISP B.
The average rate for ISP C customers is 0.5R less than its average rate when none of the ISPs had cooperated with the P2P provider.
IV. MODELING COOPERATION IN MULTI-ISP NETWORKS
To quantify the risks associated with the three approaches of P2P-ISP cooperation, we will first develop a mathematical language before the numerical and analytical results are presented. The common entity in all the approaches summarized in Section II is an oracle, which collects information and gives hints to the P2P provider. The main difference between these approaches is whether the ISP gets individual and indirect involvement (Approach A), no involvement (Approach B), or collective, direct involvement (Approach C) in oracle. These hints may depend on the network topology, peer locations, ISP and P2P preferences and their incentives. Observing these hints, the ISP downloads content more from some ISPs than the others. We abstract the oracle's hints by a metric β ij and the possible manipulations by the P2P provider by a metric α ij . Fig. 5 shows the overview of the model.
A. Oracle hint metric: β ij
The willingness of an ISP to exchange traffic with another ISP depends on network policies, distance, congestion, reliability of the link, cost relationships, etc. Providers are willing to exchange traffic with their customers. On the contrary, the customers prefer to avoid the links to their providers. Among all 26000 ISPs in the Internet, 20−30 percent are providers and the rest are customer ISPs [4] . The oracle needs to negotiate the conflicting preferences of the ISPs on both sides of a link.
We model the hints the oracle provides to the P2P provider about ISP preferences by the metric β ij . The oracle assigns the weight β ij to the link from ISP i to ISP j, showing the joint preference of ISPs i and j for sending unit traffic volume from ISP i to ISP j. If ISP j requests a traffic volume, the P2P provider considers β ij s for all incoming links to ISP j.
Let β Since the P2P provider is the party making the peering decisions, it has the freedom to ignore or enforce preferences of some ISPs (captured by metric β ij ) more than others, to reroute or localize traffic. We model such P2P incentives to manipulate traffic by α ij . The metric α ij assigned by the P2P provider to manipulate the traffic flow from ISP i to ISP j. This can be independent from what the ISPs themselves prefer through the β ij metrics. As an example, by assigning a large α ij to a link with lower β ij , the P2P provider induces ISP i to send more content to ISP j. Similarly, by assigning a small α ij to a link with higher β ij , it can prevent ISP i from sending as much content to ISP j as originally preferred by ISP i.
By varying α, P2P providers might observe the preferences of some ISPs more than the others to fulfill special agreements with them. Additionally, by assigning higher α values to innetwork links than to the other links, they can choose to localize the traffic. In Figure 6 , ISP 1 receives more content from ISP 2 than ISP 3 since β 21 > β 31 , if P2P provider does not manipulate the traffic. However, by setting α 21 << α 31 , it can prevent ISP 2 from providing more content than ISP 3.
C. Peering Decisions by the P2P provider
The P2P provider is the party doing the peering decisions. If an ISP requests a traffic volume, the P2P provider determines which ISP should send what fraction of that content. By allocating the traffic it takes into account its own interests and the preferences of the ISPs, which are reflected in the hints from the oracles. We have modeled the P2P provider's interests by α ij and the hints from the oracles by β ij .
Let θ ij be the fraction of the traffic volume that ISP j downloads from ISP i. We define the utility of the P2P provider as ISP j downloads θ ij percent of its traffic volume from ISP i by a log function to achieve proportional fairness (with a vertical shift of 1 to avoid negative utility):
Recall that β ij is an indicator of the joint preference of ISP i and ISP j for sending unit traffic from ISP i to ISP j. Thus β ij θ ij indicates to the P2P provider the satisfaction This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the IEEE "GLOBECOM" 2009 proceedings.
978-1-4244-4148-8/09/$25.00 ©2009 of ISP i and ISP j from allocating θ ij fraction of the traffic. We also assume that the P2P provider places more weight in its own preferences than the ISP hints and this is reflected in the choice of the utility function (1) with α ij being outside the logarithmic function. When ISP j requests traffic volume V , the P2P provider allocates fractions θ ij separately for each ISP j by maximizing the sum utility, N i=1 U ij (·) for all the N ISPs from which ISP j downloads traffic:
This is mathematically equivalent to the water-filling problem [5] and the optimal solution is
The water levels are modified by the P2P preferences and the ISP preferences act similar to the levels over which water is filled. Parameter λ is calculated from
Let P be the set of all ISPs i providing content to ISP j, such that θ ij > 0. From (3) and (4) the closed form for θ ij is
From (5), we state the following lemma which can be proved easily: Lemma 1: θ ij is an increasing function of both α ij and β ij . Thus links with high α ij and β ij receive higher traffic volumes.
D. Recovering Approaches A, B, C
The approaches A, B, C differ in how the β ij is determined. In approach A in Section II-A, β ij shows only the preferences of the ISP who employ the oracle. In approach B in Section II-B, ISPs do not have direct involvement on determining β ij . Here β ij is set inversely proportional to the inferred distances between ISPs. In approach C of Section II-C, the β ij is an indicator of the p4p distances which takes into account of the preferences of ISPs on both sides of a link. The ISPs that are close in terms of p4p distance will be assigned higher β ij . Solving, (2), the traffic is fairly allocated between ISPs letting ISP i with higher β ij provide much more content to the the ISP j unless P2P providers interfere by varying α ij . Assigning weights to the links for traffic allocation is common in the existing P2P-ISP cooperating approaches. As an example, in approach C traffic allocation is done by minimizing the p4p distances between clusters of peers which corresponds here maximizing β ij . The undesirable P2P-ISP behavior is captured by ability to choose any value for α ij and β ij .
The risk we just modeled is the capability of P2P providers, through cooperation with ISPs, to induce ISP traffic management strategies that are undesirable. Such risks are also present in the current networks, where they have to infer each other's information. The P2P providers have incentives as modeled by α and but limited information on β ij , which limits their actions. However, if there is cooperation they could obtain it without relying on noisy network measurements and traffic monitoring, thus amplifying these risks.
E. Cost Model
We denote the cost for ISP j to exchange content (send or receive) with ISP i by q 
The net cost for ISP j to send content to the other ISPs in P is C
The net cost of ISP j in exchanging traffic with ISPs in P is
The net income is defined as I avr,j = −C avr,j .
F. Efficiency Model
Let R ij be the rate which peers in ISP j experience when they download content from peers in ISP i. Thus, θ ij fraction of V j is downloaded in θ ij V j /R ij time units. The average rate to download V j is
We define the rate efficiency η r and cost efficiency η c for the total network as
G. Fairness Model
If ISPs and P2P providers cooperate, the increase in rate and decrease in cost will be compared to the cost and rate if there were no cooperation. Let R j n and C j n be the average rate and cost when the ISP j does not cooperate with the P2P provider. We define the rate and cost fairness metrics r j and c j of ISP j as
Obviously, it is desired to have r j > 0 and c j > 0 for a cooperating ISP. If ISP 9 has enough peers, it experiences exceptionally high average rates as it is induced to supply its traffic demand within the network (β → 0). If its peers are overloaded it will face disproportionally worse rates as β → 0. As β → 2, ISP 9 is induced to supply to download its whole traffic demand from other ISPs resulting worse rates than the random peer assignment (β = 1)
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
We consider the topology as depicted in Fig. 7 . It is a reannotated graph of a real topology inferred in [6] . ISP 1 to ISP 6 are peers and exchange traffic between each other at no cost. ISP 7 and ISP 8 are their customers. ISP 9 is a customer of both ISP 7 and ISP 8.
A. Disproportional benefits for non-cooperating ISPs
Assume all ISP's in Fig. 7 except the ISP 9 are cooperating with the P2P provider. The P2P provider does not manipulate ISP preferences, and sets α ij = 1 for all links. We set β i9 = β for i = 1 . . . 8 and β 99 = 1. If β > β 99 , ISP 9 will be induced to download more content from the peers in the other ISPs, if β < β 99 it would be forced to supply its traffic demand within the network. β = β 99 corresponds to the scenario where the peers are randomly assigned to each other. Fig. 8 shows the variation of the average rate versus β. For β < 1 we consider two cases: (1) ISP 9 has enough peers to supply its traffic demand. (2) Supplying the whole traffic demand would overload the peers within the network and reduce in-network Cost decrease for ISP 9 as the P2P provider prevents him to exchange traffic ISP 7 and ISP 8 (α → 0). As α → 0 the expenditures of ISP 7 and ISP 8 increase and their income from ISP 9 decrease. They are worse off than ISP 9 in terms of net income. download rates. In the first case the ISP 9 is better off by not cooperating since it could get maximum possible average rate by supplying its traffic within the network. In the second case its peers are overloaded. It experiences much worse rates than the case where all peers in the network are randomly assigned to each other.
In this example we set the average rate to download within the ISP to R and the average rate to download from other ISPs to R/2. This assumption is consistent with the previous work [2] that the download rates from the peers within the same ISP are higher. If ISP 9 does not have enough peers and it is able to supply only θ max = 0.25 of its traffic volume at rate R, then we set the rate to download within the network to min(R, θ max /θ 99 R) to model the decrease in download rates when the peers are overloaded.
B. Manipulations by the P2P provider
All ISP's in Fig. 7 request a traffic volume of V and exchange traffic between each other. ISP 9 pays q per unit exchanged traffic to ISP 7 and ISP 8. ISP 7 and ISP 8 exchange with each other at cost q per unit traffic since they are connected through their providers. They meet the demand within the ISP with no cost. We set β ij = 1 for i = j and β ii = 2, showing the preference of ISPs for localizing the traffic.
Assume the P2P provider has incentive to manipulate the traffic for ISP 9. We set α 79 , α 97 , α 89 , α 97 , which are metrics for incoming and outgoing links of ISP 9 equal to α. Other α ij 's are set to 1. As α → 0 in Fig. 9 the P2P provider prevents ISP 7 and ISP 8 to exchange traffic with ISP 9. ISP 9 is induced to meet most of its traffic demand within the network. ISP 7 and ISP 8 are induced to exchange traffic with each other and their providers, instead of ISP 9. Their net revenue from inter-ISP agreement gets lower than that of ISP 9. As α → 2 the P2P provider induces ISP 9 to download its traffic demand from ISP 7 and ISP 8. At the same time, ISP
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978-1-4244-4148-8/09/$25.00 ©2009 Fig. 10. Cost Fairness versus α: As α → 0 the cost fairness for ISP 9 is higher than ISP 7 and ISP 8. ISP 7 and ISP 8 get negative cost fairness although they are cooperating. As α → 2 the cost fairness for ISP 9 decrease as the P2P provider induces him to exchange traffic with ISP 7 and ISP 8 both ways. As α → 2 the cost fairness increase for ISP 7 and ISP 8 as they exchange much more content with ISP 9.
7 and ISP 8 supply their traffic demand from ISP 9. The cost increases tremendously for ISP 9, whereas ISP 7 and ISP 8 reduce their expenditures and increase their incomes. Fig. 10 shows the corresponding cost fairness metric versus α. As α → 0 we see that ISP 7 and ISP 8 get worse cost fairness than ISP 9. Moreover, ISP 7 and ISP 8 get negative cost fairness although they are cooperating since they are induced to exchange content with their providers instead of ISP 9. As α → 2 the cost fairness for ISP 7 and ISP 8 increase since they exchange much more content with ISP 9. On the contrary, as α → 2 the cost fairness decreases for ISP 9 as it is induced to exchange more content with its provider ISPs.
VI. CONDITIONS FOR RISK-FREE COOPERATION
In this and the next section, we focus on mitigation aspects of some particular risks of P2P-ISP cooperation discussed so far. Consider an ISP j. Let the average rate to download θ jj V , the traffic within the network, be R, and the average rate to download (1 − θ jj )V from other ISPs be R/K. Since the average rate to download the content within the ISP is greater that from out of network, K > 1. The peers in a cooperating ISP j will experience the average rate
If an ISP j cooperates, θ jj is determined from (5) . If ISP j does not cooperate, the peer assignment is random and θ ij = 1/N for all ISPs i. Therefore, the average rate for the peers in ISP j will be
Lemma 2: The peers in an ISP j will always receive a higher average rates when the ISP cooperates than when it does not if
Proof: For K > 1, the peers in ISP j will get always better average rates when ISP j cooperating and R j,c ≥ R j,n . Substituting for R j,c and R j,n from (12) and (13) we obtain the desired result after some algebraic manipulations.
Theorem 1: Let |P| be the cardinality of P. If α ij = α, ∀i for a given ISP j, the peers in that ISP j get higher average rates, when ISP j cooperates and if the hint metrics satisfy the following condition:
Proof: Setting (5) in (14) we obtain,
The result follows from substituting α ij = α for all i, in the condition (16). Remark 1: If |P| = N , then condition (15) simplifies to:
the harmonic mean of the hint metrics. Remark 2: A cooperating ISP might choose to hide its peers from the non-cooperating ISPs to reduce its outgoing traffic. That will reduce number of ISPs from which the non cooperating ISP can get content. Now assume only L of the N ISPs are willing to provide content to the non-cooperating ISP. In this case the rate R i,n (13) will increase since L < N. As L decreases it is more likely that condition (14) is violated.
VII. RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES
We present one of the many possible risk mitigation strategies in this section. Since the P2P provider is the party doing the peering decisions, it has the capability to increase the rate and cost fairness for a specific ISP by reallocating some fraction of the traffic demand V . When an ISP j joins cooperation it lets the P2P provider know R j n and C j n and its minimum fairness levels r j and c j as requirements to continue the cooperation. Similarly, the P2P provider sets thresholds on fairness levels to prevent some ISPs from getting disproportional gain or loss from cooperation.
Let θ be the traffic allocation vector including θ ij s for ISP j determined as a solution of (2) . If the traffic allocation θ results in a rate fairness r (11) and average rate is R avr but the desired fairness level isŕ, the P2P provider chooses to allocate only κV based on (2) where 0 < κ < 1. It reallocates the remaining (1 − κ)V using another strategy which yields the average rateR. Allocating κ fraction of V by solving (2) would again yield the average rate R avr and the traffic allocation vector κθ. Assume the P2P provider has another traffic allocation strategy which could result in an average rate This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the IEEE "GLOBECOM" 2009 proceedings.
978-1-4244-4148-8/09/$25.00 ©2009 R. An example to such strategy could be downloading content within the network at higher rate. Based on this strategy,R is set equal to the average rate to download within the network. To reduce r, the P2P provider could choose the strategy that allocates (1 − κ)V evenly to the other ISPs. In this caseR will be set to the average rate to download from other ISPs.
If the P2P provider reallocates (1 − κ)V using the strategy that results in an average rate ofR then fairness level will be raised toŕ. The P2P provider determines κ from:
Similarly, if the traffic allocation θ results in a cost fairness c and average cost is C avr but the desired fairness level iś c, the P2P provider needs to reallocate (1 − κ)V using a traffic allocation strategy that results in the average costC. κ is determined by:
We plot in Fig.11 , for the ISPs in SectionV-B, the fairness metric r versus parameter α. For ISP 9 we consider two cases: (1) If the P2P provider does not control the rate fairness, the rate fairness drops to r = 0.05 as α → 2. (2) If the fairness drops below the thresholdŕ = 0.2 the P2P provider reallocates some fraction of the traffic in order to reachŕ. The strategy of the P2P provider to download within the network yields an average rate of R. The P2P provider setsR = R and determines κ from (18). Reallocating (1 − κ)V at average rate R prevents raises fairness metric back toŕ.
The P2P provider could also detect uncooperative behavior of ISPs by monitoring changes in rate and cost efficiency (10). The disproportionate losses or gains for some ISP would result in noticeable changes in efficiency.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS ON P2P-ISP COOPERATION
We believe that P2P and ISP need to cooperate, and the benefits of sharing information in general can be larger than the downsides. Towards realizing this goal, we focus this paper on the risks of such cooperation, by building a mathematical model for the three recent approaches of cooperation, classifying the potential risks and metrics, and developing numerical examples and analytical results on some of the major unintended or counter-intuitive behaviors, especially when multiple ISPs co-exist and form their own peering relationships.
The risks associated with P2P-ISP cooperation can be mitigated to a great extent with appropriate changes to the existing proposals. Some of the guidelining principles are as follows, and their quantification presents an interesting next step in fully understanding the best P2P-ISP collaboration mechanism:
1) Avoid ISP owned oracle for inter-ISP peering decisions. An ISP supported oracle can give better hints for doing efficient in-network peering decisions. However, ISPs may have conflicting preferences for inter-ISP links. Therefore, such oracles are selfish, when it comes to making inter-ISP peering assignments. A two-tier hierarchy may be used to overcome this problem. Local oracles like the iTracker [3] or the ISP oracle in [1] could be used for peering decisions within the corresponding ISP. For inter-ISP peering decisions, centralized oracles are needed to balance the preferences of multiple ISPs in a fair manner. 2) Auditors. It is difficult to ensure that P2P providers or ISPs provide correct information to each other. However, the consequences of such malicious behavior can be detected by third parties. To enforce fairness, independent parties can offer tools to monitor P2P traffic. They may deploy in each cooperating ISP traffic monitors for the verification of information or to give statistical information on peering tendencies. 3) Partial observance of the oracle hints. P2P providers can still choose to make some portions of the peering assignments randomly or based on delay.
